Technology For Affordability

A Report on the Activities of the Working Groups

Integrated Product/Process Development
Simplified Contracting
Dual-Use Manufacturing

The National Center for Advanced Technologies

December, 1993


Contents


IPPD FOR ELECTRONICS WORKING GROUP (AIA Led)

SIMPLIFIED CONTRACTING WORKING GROUP (NSIA Led)

MULTI-USE MANUFACTURING WORK PANEL (EIA Led)

INDUSTRY AFFORDABILITY STEERING GROUP


TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN;

I am pleased to forward "Technology for Affordability", a report by the National Center for Advanced Technologies which sums up the 1993 efforts of three working groups formed under the leadership of the Industry Affordability Steering Group within the terms of contract F33615-92-D-5812 & LAI 92-5708-129-1.

The overall objective of the working groups was to outline the environment in which the future defense needs of the nation would be provided, and to develop government/industry "Affordability" technology strategies and action plans that would be needed to meet the challenges of that environment.

The Industry Affordability Steering Group provides a coordinated inter association method to develop conceptes and implementing strategies for the application of Affordability Technology to Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATD), Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) and other pre-acquisition activities. These strategies will lead to the efforts that will establish the criteria and roadmaps industry can follow to achieve multi - use manufacturing processes and products.

NCAT provided the coordination and integration secretariat for of the inter association efforts. Each of the working groups was led very ably by their respective chairmen. The volunteer participants are commended for their time and effort. The chairmen, their team members, and the associations and companies that supported their efforts are to be complimented.

J. Clifford Schoep
President, NCAT


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper provides a perspective of the Industry Task Force addressing technology for Affordability, and defines the role of the National Center for Advanced Technologies (NCAT) in support of this DDR&E-sponsored effort.

As the Department of Defense's resources grow smaller, a significant redirection of Research & Development practices will be needed. Technical risk, Producibility, and Affordability will be considered much earlier than in the traditional process. As a consequence, many of the risk reduction, producibility activities and cost estimates which were key elements of the traditional Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase of the defense system acquisition will now be addressed in the advanced technology development phases. While this may be new territory for traditional defense acquisition, some successful commercial high technology industries are already successfully operating in this mode.

The mission of the Industry Affordability Steering Group was to develop implementing strategies for application of Affordability Technology to ATDs and pre-acquisition activities, and to promote government-industry dialogue on both technology and business practice issues. NCAT's role was to facilitate the activities of the task force, provide an integrating catalyst between the various working groups, and to serve as the singular focal point between the Steering Group's workteams, government agencies, and other industry and professional associations. It was in fact the ability to marshal resources in an "Association of Associations" venue and draw upon industry resources that resulted in the successful completion of the three working groups providing the grist for this report.

The overall objective was to develop a government/industry consensus on the Affordability technology strategies and actions necessary to meet the R&D challenges of the post Cold War era.

Key deliverables from this strategy include: Implementing strategy recommendations for Integrated Product/Process Development in the technology base and ATDs, Multi-use manufacturing, and simplified contracting for ATDs. Criteria for the application of these techniques, as well as education and training programs to explain their use to the users were also parts of the deliverables.


INTEGRATED PRODUCT/PROCESS DEVELOPMENT (IPPD)

Integrated Product/Process Development (IPPD) is seen as a management methodology that incorporates a systematic approach to the early integration and concurrent application of all the disciplines that play a part throughout a system's life cycle. Key features of IPPD implementation include:

A number of key issues and concerns, and outright barriers need to be recognized and addressed to insure the successful implementation of the revolutionary approach to advanced development. They fall into three distinct categories, Regulatory, Managerial Practice, and Technical.

A new approach is needed to assure a producible and affordable product design is ready to be integrated with other mature technology in the 6.4 Engineering Manufacturing Development(EMD) phase. At this point an IPPD team is needed to achieve an optimum balance of performance and Affordability objectives. If a formal production decision does not take place until the 6.4 EMD phase, the flexibility of the S&T funding process (6.3b) can be used to advantage. Industry's internal research and development program needs to be leveraged, and changes made in both the present Acquisition strategy and the early R&D phases if Risk and Cycle time are to be improved.

SIMPLIFIED CONTRACTING

The goal of this working group was to find a workable approach to contracting for advanced technology demonstrations using IPPD that would approach commercial practices. The methodology would include an examination of case studies of programs that were successful using modified or streamlined Department of Defense contracting practices.

Commercial companies report they find it difficult to sell to the government because of:

The initial step in developing a workable approach to contracting for ATDs using IPPD with the government is to select a model of a program that demonstrates the fact that simplified contracting will work. After the selection, showing how and why it worked would be the next logical step, followed by an explanation of the payoffs that resulted, and any replicable "lessons learned" that were picked up along the way. After considering a number of candidate approaches, the X-31 activities provided the model/template program.

MULTI-USE MANUFACTURING

Multi-use manufacturing was defined by the working group as "the ability to design and flexibly produce in a common 'factory', independent of lot size, a range of high quality products, thereby providing multiple, low volume, DoD products, access to advanced commercially viable processes and facilities with high volume economies."

There have been many markets targeted for the infusion of Defense technology. However, just as in the commercial market place, there is no guarantee that the first technology to the marketplace will result in the successful product. Table 1 illustrates this point. The successful prosecution of infusing defense technology in the marketplace depends on a number of variables, and not the mere existence of defense technology.

There are basically three strategic options:

The current unplanned evolutionary approach to Multi-Use Manufacturing isn't producing the required results. It is clear that broad front planning and enabling will dissipate already severely limited resources which are better used on lower risk choices. This middle road answer revolves around a strategy of Selective Enabling through product focused DEMOS.

Each team operated independently, and while there was crosstalk at work shop conferences twice during the effort, the teams ideas and findings were generally not known to each other until the wrap up sessions. The significance of this lies in the almost unanimous finding and recommendations in areas of Multi-Use manufacturing and Integrated Product/Process Development.

Significant findings and recommendations in the IPPD area and the multi-use manufacturing area indicates there is more work to be done in the implementation

Continuing in the work started by these three groups, an Industry Task Force has been formed, under the sponsorship of DDR&E, with the wholehearted support of the industry associations, and through the Secretariat of the National Center for Advanced Technologies to create the roadmaps and action plans for implementation of IPPD in Development Programs, the conduction of Multi-Use manufacturing in an Advanced Technology Demonstration and to further the industry 's direction on simplified contracting. The Task Force, Which kicked-off 1994 activites on January 19th 1994 will also address Intergrated Product/Process Development for mechanical products and the Enterprise Integration, the use of information systems to manage the organization and the industry.

SCOPE OF THRUST 7

In a memorandum dated December 19, 1991, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Officially established a Strategy for a Science & Technology Planning Exercise. A "Strategic Framework for Defense Science And Technology" was attached to the memo as a planning guide. The framework established 7 thrusts , five of which are directly focused on system needs -- Global Surveillance & Communications, Precision Strike, Air Superiority & Defense, Sea Control & Undersea Superiority, and Advanced Land Combat Vehicles. Thrust six deals with computer simulation (Synthetic Environments) and thrust seven, the foundation of this report, deals with Technology for Affordability. Thrust 7 then includes system life-cycle Affordability, including all the aspects of hardware and software for which technology leverage exists. The programmatic span includes 6.1 through 6.3a and the resources which were then identified within the MANTECH program. Although Thrust 7 focuses on reducing unit and life cycle costs of defense systems, the reduction in cost and time needed to transition technology into production is an essential factor of determining success of the concept. While Affordability is essential to the success of the implementation of Thrusts 1 through 5, the Thrust for Affordability will carve out the change in the future methodology of defense acquisition, encompassing all of the processes and products from the pure idea to the factory floor and beyond the useful life to the recovery and recycling of materials. Past efforts, workshops, symposia, and conferences have all identified the elements of the successful conduct of Thrust 7 as being operations on a daily basis that incorporates the fundamentals of Concurrent Engineering or Integrated Product/Process Development, Flexible Manufacturing, Enterprise Integration, and Hardware-Software integration.

As the Department of Defense's resources grow smaller, a significant redirection of Research & Development practices will be needed. Technical risk, Producibility, and Affordability will be considered much earlier than in the traditional process. As a consequence, many of the risk reduction, producibility activities and cost estimates which were key elements of the traditional Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase of the defense system acquisition will now be addressed in the advanced technology development phases. While this may be new territory for traditional defense acquisition, some successful commercial high technology industries are already successfully operating in this mode.

The new rephasing, a vital part of IPPD, will require major changes in both government and industry processes and practices. In 1992, under the guidance of the Director, Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E), the National Center for Advanced Technologies (NCAT) assembled an Industry Affordability Steering Group (IASG) to determine the strategies needed to implement these changes These challenges are significant, especially since typical defense contractors do not have experience in applying Integrated Product Process Development in phase in Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATD). Although there have been individual examples of dual use manufacturing, the concept has never been applied on a broad scale, nor has it evolved from a planned pre-acquisition activity.

It is increasingly clear that the DoD's response to post Cold War conditions and budgets will require a significant shift in R&D strategy and practice. Issues of technical risk, producibility, and Affordability will need to be considered much earlier in the R&D effort than has been the case historically.

The Secretary of Defense highlighted the issue in policy statements relating to new starts and major upgrades. These will be allowed to proceed only after the operational need has been validated, the technical risks are well understood and controllable, and the costs are affordable. In addition, as the procurement budget is reduced, the DoD must rely more heavily on firms whose production base is primarily commercial, rather than the defense industrial base built up during the Cold War.

The Defense Science Board specifically identified Integrated Product & Process Development (IPPD) and Dual-Use Manufacturing as key components of the new R&D strategy and recommended experiments be conducted using these techniques in ATDs. A strategy for implementation of these activities in the technology base in general, and ATDs in particular, is needed to ensure the DoD maintains a technological lead over any potential challenger.

The mission of the Industry Affordability Steering Group was to develop implementing strategies for application of Affordability Technology to ATDs and pre-acquisition activities, and to promote government-industry dialogue on both technology and business practice issues. NCAT's role was to facilitate the activities of the task force, provide an integrating catalyst between the various working groups, and to serve as the singular focal point between the Steering Group force, government agencies, and other industry and professional associations. It was in fact the ability to marshal resources in an "Association of Associations" venue and draw upon industry resources that resulted in the successful completion of the three working groups providing the grist for this report.

The overall objective was to develop a government/industry consensus on the Affordability technology strategies and actions necessary to meet the R&D challenges of the post Cold War era.

Specific objectives of the 1993 -1994 effort were:

Approach:

The industry Affordability task force approach to developing this implementing strategy is to apply successful commercial practices and processes to selected Advanced Technology Demonstrations. Working groups analyze successful examples of Affordability technology for application to DoD pre-acquisition efforts. An Affordability Steering Group, made up of senior government industry and university representatives, reviews and guided the activities of the various working groups. Specific steps in the approach were :

  1. Establish working groups to develop implementing strategies in selected commercial practices/processes.
  2. Conduct government/industry forums with thrust leaders and ATD managers to identify issues and address implementing criteria.
  3. Develop integrated implementing strategy recommendations for a feasibility/demo track and ultimately, an acquisition track.
  4. Conduct broad based symposia to disseminate results.
  5. Educate Thrust Leaders, ATD Mangers, and other industry, government, and academia people on processes and benefits.
  6. Monitor progress and document results of application to selected ATDs.
Key deliverables from this strategy include: Implementing strategy recommendations for Integrated Product/Process Development in the technology base and ATDs, Multi-use manufacturing, and simplified contracting for ATDs. Criteria for the application of these techniques, as well as education and training programs to explain their use to the users were also parts of the deliverables.

The overall DoD S&T strategy was presented to a large audience of government, industry and academia personnel on November 6, 1992. Agreement with major trade associations were then made to recognize NCAT as the industry focal point for the Technology for Affordability efforts. Members of the associations made up the resources for the working groups under the Affordability Steering Group, the senior government, industry and academia review committee.

Workshops were held on December 9 & 10 1992 . Joint industry and government panels considered four candidate practices for application to ATDs. Following the four presentations to key S&T strategy leaders, two were selected for immediate development of implementation strategy and tools. Working groups on IPPD-Electronics, chaired by AIA, and Multi-Use Manufacturing, chaired by EIA, gathered data and developed their recommendations. The working group leaders reported their progress to the Steering Group in January and July 1993. In May of 1993, the third working group, Simplified contracting for ATDs, chaired by NSIA, was formed.

The education and training activity resulted in a development of a satellite/video training course on applications of Integrated Product/Process Development. the course was developed in cooperation with the National Technological University and Georgia Institute of Technology . The program was presented as an NTU satellite education series. A concentrated version may be utilized for Thrust Leader training. Video tapes of the entire series are available.

While the three activities were conducted as parallel efforts, (the third, Simplified Contracting followed the other two in time very closely), it is important that the integration of the ideas captured by all three is necessary. The three have applicability to the ATD and should be considered as having a singular purpose, that is attaining affordable systems in the future by using near commercial like practices in process es, product development, and contracting. For the purpose of this report however, the three are handled separately, in order to demonstrate more clearly the thought process of the working groups.


INTEGRATED PRODUCT/PROCESS DEVELOPMENT

Integrated Product/Process Development (IPPD) is seen as a management methodology that incorporates a systematic approach to the early integration and concurrent application of all the disciplines that play a part throughout a system's life cycle. It incorporates the development, production and support of products and processes that lead to competitive products that ultimately must satisfy customer requirements. IPPD recognizes that every player in the product's life cycle is important. Therefore, pooling talent instead of separating it is a better idea at the starting point. From the beginning of a project, all of the players must be involved: the designer, supplier, customer, tooling, sales, and the factory floor worker. Since the products are extremely complex, and the time to produce them very lengthy, it must be recognized that no one player, or single functional discipline, has all the information to conduct any part of the operation alone. Producing a product today requires every one's expertise and participation. Everyone within the IPPD system has a customer to satisfy, and satisfying that internal customer generally means maximum attention to quality and cost. That means substantially more interaction between groups that, in the past, met only in a sequential hand-off mode. The designer passed drawings to the die maker who passed tools to the fabricator etc., etc. Today, The only way this can be done is through information exchange, with all participants concurring before the final decision on design, process, fabrication, and production is made. In the future, the traditional conference table or "face-to-face" meeting of principals of functional areas will be replaced by electronic interfaces. So, today's meetings will become tomorrow's electronic drawing boards around which every player will have an opportunity to brainstorm, and to have an appreciation for the viewpoint of all the participants in the program. Whatever the medium, the important thing is the need for constant, up-front, early communication of all participants for a manufacturing enterprise to be successful. Communication is an absolute necessity whether it is verbal or electronic. Key features of IPPD implementation include:

Many Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) programs are currently organized and managed using IPPD methodology. The (F-22 aircraft and subsystems, and the RH-66 Comanchee programs are examples).

IPPD tears down the traditional "walls" that were evident between functional areas of the company, replacing the walls with communication avenues. It becomes a rigorous process that involves every functional aspect of the enterprise, starting with the design process reacting to the customer requirement. It is a process methodology rather than a product methodology and considers every aspect of the "team" effort. In spite of its "goodness", IPPD is not easy to implement. It is not readily accepted by older management groups, particularly at the middle management level. It has been proven, however, that top management (the leadership of the company) can affect the change. IPPD can be made readily acceptable to all, when top management takes an active part in the sponsorship of the effort. If top management involves themselves in the process, the speed and quality of the feedback information will be maximized, and the success of the transition assured. In the past, roles of the functional participants were narrowly defined, and engineers performed the engineering effort with that only in mind. In the IPPD process, engineers are required to think like manufacturers, specification writers like detail designers, but more importantly everyone thinks and sees like the end customer, the User. Mistakes are detected early, and production problems are solved well before they reach the factory floor.

Effecting these changes can not be done in a "business as usual" environment. A revolutionary approach is needed to achieve the improvement necessary. In order for a "revolutionary" change to take place, transitions are required in the traditional areas. Some of these transitions are highlighted in figure 1.

Figure 1. Transitions to IPPD

Design processes must be aimed at Affordability rather than design for performance. The requirement paradigm must be addressed directly; it is not an easy one to confront. Trade offs between Performance and Affordability must be made in order to field the system, however compromises made in Affordability can not compromise mission requirements. That's why the user is an important member of the decision making team. It is this teamwork approach, rather than individual innovation, that will bring success through consensus. Everyone understands the old axiom, "the customer is always right" That philosophy is predicated on customer receipt of the product, and if the customer's requirements were not satisfied by the product, the product could be in effect "returned". In the manufacturing world "return" takes the form of rework, repair, retrofit, recall, redesign, and in the worst case litigation, default, debarment and scandal. In all cases the expense of the product grows along with the amount of time required to field it. That process is no longer affordable in today's environment. It actually was never desirable, but in the past, affordability, and resource availability were never considered as important as performance.

The table of transitions required to achieve integrated product and process shows a number of ideas that have to be considered in the successful "revolution". The entire list may not be necessary for total implementation success, and the list is not in any prioritized order. Two points however, are fundamental to the IPPD process: Concurrent development rather than serial development is needed, and the team approach to the decision process can not be by-passed. Digital simulation rather than hardware prototypes would be the "icing on the cake" of a newly revolutionized enterprise. However, at some point you need to make a saleable product. Ideally, an excellent IPPD process will allow the first product to be perfect, eliminating costly rework, repair, and "the learning curve."

BARRIERS

A number of key issues and concerns, and outright barriers need to be recognized and addressed to insure the successful implementation of the revolutionary approach to advanced development. They fall into three distinct categories, Regulatory, Managerial Practice, and Technical.

REGULATORY
For several years, there has be an on-going discussion, if not outright controversy, on the rights to data and intellectual property. One of the most important factors of the success of the IPPD process is the sharing of information. This sharing not only takes place within the walls of the company but with vendors, suppliers, customers, and potential rivals or competitors as well. Although some companies have suceeded in sharing information with team members in an IPPD process, the controversy revolving around "rights in data" has not yet been sufficiently resolved to allow a level of information sharing to reach the levels of cooperation for partnerships of companies to achieve IPPD systems.

Throughout the years, government acquisition and contracting was predicated on a cost based pricing policy. (Whatever contractual instrument was used, the price to the government customer for goods and services was generally based on some calculation derived from how much it cost the company to produce.) Margins that were lower than commercial were generally the rule. Profits or "fees" normally ranged from 3% to 11% of costs depending on the type or phase of the acquisition. Cost reduction was a disincentive if the profit was based on cost of operation or sales. Commercial pricing, the direction in which appears to be the future for government acquisition, is principally based on what the market will bear , after all costs of operations, are covered and a preset "hurdle rate" is achieved. While that calculation may not be the most appealing to government or recommended by this report, some methodology in a between ground needs to be sought to provide an incentive for a defense company to aggressively reduce costs while reaping the benefits of such aggressiveness.

Likewise, the cost sharing of company Research and Development, the "up-til-now" philosophy of applying resources to new technology, is less of an incentive for a company to vigorously pursue new technology on its own than enjoying a straight "profit" for advancing technology to the next plateau, or the next step.

Along the same lines, current laws and regulatory requirements historically promulgated by government acquisition agencies have, been added to and added to, until the present level of regulation that stifles progress has evolved. Funding approvals for ongoing long-term programs have been a big deterrent in defense companies ability and will continue with their efforts on government contracts.

Historically, defense contractors have operated on the horns of a dilemma with respect to vendor operations. The government customer would not get involved in the relationship or any business dealing between the prime and subcontractor. However, the amount of "flowdown" requirements imposed by the government for the prime, or system integrator level of contractor, to require vendors and suppliers to work under, has been steadily increasing over the years.

MANAGERIAL PRACTICES
Up to today, government programs conducted in house by an industry contractor have been primarily done on a program-by-program, contract-by-contract basis instead of multiple programs, serving multiple services/agencies being contracted by a single agency. Typically, there was no "dual use" philosophy in mind, in product or process. Operating in that manner led to confusion, there were multiple, usually at-odds directions given, and a high level of duplication between the programs. Past programs have been conducted in a sequential funding process for R&D rather than a concurrent process, one that will be needed to capture the advances in technology and allow quick and direct applications to the product. Earlier R&D resource application to the manufacturing, quality, R&M processes will reduce downstream costs. Accepting this idea, however, will result in increased up front expenditures, making the initial stages of future programs cost more. In reality, this increased up-font expenditure will greatly reduce the lifetime cost of the program. Another change from the past practice will be the team effort of companies. This teaming may transcend the intracompany team effort, a difficult enough accomplishment within today's internally competitive companies. Teaming will have to be inter company, sharing resources, ideas, customers, and even data for any one company to get along in the future.

TECHNICAL
Manufacturability and the processes that support production, must be considered in the earliest phases of R&D. The enterprise must be sure that the design for high technology solutions can indeed be produced. It makes no sense if the lightest, most flexible, highest tensile strength material is being designed into tomorrow's fighter aircraft or armored vehicle, if it cannot be produced on the manufacturing floor. Typically, this has not been done until design completion. Traditionally, Critical Design Review has been accomplished before any manufacturability considerations have been addressed and passed to the manufacturing floor. As materials used in the fabrication of future products continue to become more and more exotic, the necessity to understand their characteristics and variability parameters through scientific assessment will become increasingly important. The understanding and application of advanced materials in the production of advanced designs must be addressed and resolved early in the revolutionary approach to advanced development.

The last of the barriers to successful implementation is the lack of knowledge or the ability to precisely assess the economic benefits of common parts for multi use application, or the use of commercial parts in defense products.

STRATEGIES

Since 85% of the product cycle cost is established in the early systems engineering concepts, designing for manufacturability, producibility, reliability and maintainability must be started prior to the advanced development phase (6.3). The Manufacturing Science and Technology (MS&T) Program defines selective technology requiring materials characterization, process innovation and process physics to be integrated into 6.1 and 6.2 phases. Process modeling and simulation, scalable process development, variability reduction and program ATDs are incorporated in 6.2 and 6.3 programs. Subsequent phases account for product design/manufacturing process design tradeoffs to meet cost targets, production cost analysis, product/process information system technology DEMOs, and pilot lot scaling. A full IPPD Team is probably not required prior to Advanced Development (6.3). However, manufacturers must be able to make their needs known to the researchers. Individual product DEMOS to validate performance and process DEMOS to validate manufacturability are needed in the earlier R&D phases.

Figure 2. Weapon System Development Cycle

In 6.3a and 6.3b a new approach is needed to assure a producible and affordable product design is ready to be integrated with other mature technology in the 6.4 Engineering Manufacturing Development(EMD) phase. At this point an IPPD team is needed to achieve an optimum balance of performance and Affordability objectives. If a formal production decision does not take place until the 6.4 EMD phase, the flexibility of the S&T funding process (6.3b) can be used to advantage. Industry's internal research and development program needs to be leveraged, and changes made in both the present Acquisition strategy and the early R&D phases if Risk and Cycle time are to be improved.

Evaluation of the Weapon System Development Cycle in light of the above concepts would lead to the integration of 6.3a Concept Definition with 6.3b Dem/Val. to do Advanced Development 6.3. The phases 6.1 through 6.3 can then be considered as "getting ready to go" and the start of 6.4 EMD considered as the decision "to GO" place a a specific product in the inventory. See Figure 2.

Figure 3. Metrics for Affordability Interfaces

Affordability metrics for product, process, performance and program are essential to accomplish an effective transition to EMD.

As shown in Figure 3, the traditional measurements of success are used to assess the process: Estimated yield and the number of defects per lot size are still valid measurements of process viability. Estimates of rework and scrap figures must also be considered. However, care must be taken in the reporting methodology lest misleading figures drive wrong corrections to the process. Estimates of plant capacities and capabilities provide the overall measure to compare.

Product metrics include the tracking of emerging technology and how far along the project representing the technology is in reaching performance and availability goals set in advanced development. Program measurements of Cost, Schedule, and Quality rely on traditional methods of assessing success to plan.

The integrated product/process benefits can readily be seen in plotting uncertainty versus cost and time phased technology development transition to production. (See Figure 4) The small amount of added cost between the dotted and solid lines in the early phases of R&D is more than offset by the significant cost savings between the solid and dotted lines in Low Rate Initial Production(LRIP) and production. Note that the curves follow

Figure 4. Costs Vs. Uncertainty

typical program performance measurement curves, allowing a precise measurement of program performance within the first 15% to 20% of program completion. Note also the levels of "unknowns" that diminish due to the early reduction of production process uncertainty. The most difficult explanation to be made by IPPD advocates however is the apparent increase in up-front program spending. This will cause concern and bring pressure on the program and the IPPD concept in the early phases of implementation.

The workshop panel developed a generic Advanced Development (AD) process as depicted in Figure 5, to help develop affordable multi-use products. Entrance and exit criteria, as well as controls and mechanisms are broadly defined. The gated process (methodology) steps to develop a high risk and/or high payoff product/process technology for a specific program is yet to be defined. Each project needs to be tailored to the system application based on the particular business, industry and technological risk scenario.

Before a given technology effort can be brought to advanced development, a thorough consideration of customers requirements for families of products, both defense and commercial, needs to be defined to enable multi-use application. Similarly, the state-of-the -art technology assessment needs to include both commercial and defense sub-systems, components, materials, and processes to avoid "re-inventing the wheel" and allowing designing to proven mature dual use requirements for Affordability.

Figure 5. A Proposed Model for the Advanced Development Process

By using an IPPD management system along with an IPPD maturity model and self assessment criteria, one should be able to exit from the 6.3 ATD process with generic but mature technologies ready for integration into the product application phase for both defense and commercial products. The IPPD Management System consists of employing IPPD teams, a well defined IPPD process (methodology) and cost effective enabling tools.

The steps involved in accomplishing 6.3 should include:

There is a need to establish an IPPD maturity model, as well as a self-assessment criteria to evaluate the success of the IPPD team effort. The maturity model, patterned after the Capability Maturity Model developed by the Software Engineering Institute used to evaluate software, will assess the key processes and practices chosen at the inception of the IPPD team. Similar to the CMM, the IPPD maturity model will be an aid to determining the success of the IPPD goals set. The Industry Affordability Steering Group Working Panel for IPPD, the Software Engineering Institute and the National Council on System Engineering along with the Carnegie Mellon University have been in collaboration to create such a self assessment capability model.

RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. Establish both entrance and exit criteria to and fromthe 6.3 Advanced Development process.
  2. Develop an IPPD Maturity Model and Self-Assessment Criteria from which an assessment could be used for proposal and/or program evaluation.
  3. Establish an IPPD Management System requirements definition for use of IPPD teams, development of an IPPD methodology and enabling tools to support the Advanced Development process.
  4. Implement IPPD on one or more ATD's spanning 6.3a and 6.3b
  5. Integrate 6.3a (Concept Definition) and 6.3b (Dem/Val) development phases subject to successful ATD pilots validated results in recommendation 4.

In addition the following actions are recommended to provide motivators for government and industry:


SIMPLIFIED CONTRACTING

DoD and industry agree that the means to maintain the decisive technological military superiority is by effectively harnessing the commercial industrial base. A single industrial base was key to our "Arsenal for Democracy" success in World War II. The separate DoD industrial base concept was used since WWII and saw us through the super-power stand-off years. Whether or not it was the most effective approach is now a historical consideration. What matters today is if the past methods for providing the Defense Industrial Base and the Nation's security are appropriate for the current and foreseeable environment.

The goal of this working group was to find a workable approach to contracting for advanced technology demonstrations using IPPD that would approach commercial practices. The methodology would include an examination of case studies of programs that were successful using modified or streamlined Department of Defense contracting practices. In addition, the best commercial practices would be similarly reviewed and added to the recommendations made to proposed simplified ATD contracting process. Once the identification and documentation had taken place, the next step would be to achieve a level of "buy in" by industry and government participants sufficient to cause a shift in the contracting practices to the "simplified' end of the spectrum from the "cumbersome complex" end where it is perceived to reside today. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has called for a "revolutionary change" as the approach to deal with current contracting practices. Buy-in to a well thought out idea and demonstrated application of a suggested process may be the appropriate method of initiating change for contracting in the development phases of government acquisition.

BARRIERS

A number of studies have found that there are at least several barriers which have historically and universally prevented the DoD from capitalizing on the commercial industrial base. Most commercial companies in the private sector view the government acquisition process to be to hard to work with, impossible to change, and not worth the effort to achieve the dubious success of becoming a government contractor. Commercial companies report they find it difficult to sell to the government because of:

Whether or not the company attempting to do business with the government is a prime contractor, a subcontractor or a vendor, government regulations and contracting law require an inordinate amount of special control and procedures for hiring, and the prosecution of personnel practices. Government acquisition rules and regulations (and sometimes law) dictate the interaction between two companies doing business together to provide goods and services to a common customer. The government either controls or directly influences the selection, control, management and reporting on suppliers. This is not so when two private companies operating in the marketplace combine resources and expertise to provide a product for the consumer. The commercial company hires personnel within the general guidelines of federal statutes governing the work force. This same company can hire people directly to do the job on premises or subcontract the effort to a vendor; the choices in both cases remain that of the company management with no outside requirement imposed. The significant difference between the two, of course, becomes the cost of doing business, and the attendant price to the customer after costs and fees are covered. The price in the commercial company's universe becomes whatever the market will bear. The price in the government contract world, however, becomes a result of the requirements of the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), contractually imbedded requirements for cost and pricing data, the legislated needs of Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), and a host of other agency hurdles that have to be considered in the decision to be both competitive and to stay within cost. While the commercial company can get by with the simplest form of data recording and management system to serve its needs, the complexity of the company's data management system can potentially increase substantially by merely being a successful bidder on a government contract. Tracking and management systems also increase in complexity as soon as the company transitions from commercial to government provider. Notwithstanding the need for precise cost, schedule, and quality assurance data, that any company needs to successfully pursue its business, the government generally imposes strict requirements for specific systems of "work measurement", "cost/schedule criteria", or financial accounting systems according to esoteric guidelines, and has a library of others, that not only are cumbersome, but could involve civil or criminal penalties should errors be made in the results of operating or reporting these systems.

Commercial companies doing business in the marketplace are generally selling their wares because they have a good product at an acceptable price to the consumer. One of the key ingredients to achieving that combination is the notion of the "better mousetrap" .

The commercial company is loathe to share the ideas of the inner workings of the better mousetrap, or the other ingredients that might have caused the same mousetrap to be marketed at a lower price than a competitor. When this company chooses to become a provider to the government customer however, it might have to divulge these intellectual properties as part of the deal. Because commercial companies (as well as most government providers today) feel that this reduces their competitive advantage, they do not provide specifications, or other data that could jeopardize their product's success. The government customer however, insists that the data is part of the product. Therein lies the formation of the barrier on data rights, a non-trivial issue with which to deal.

The addition of systems, the staffs necessary to cope with them, including training necessary to understand them, and the time to physically complete some of the arduous tasks, sum up to one thing: expense. In today's environment, companies are downsizing, generally lowering their overhead burden by substantial cuts in staff. The additional staff needed to keep up with systems and requirements that are perceived to have no value added to the operation of the company, let alone the product, becomes another easy reason for choosing not to do business in government acquisition. Remembering that the object of simplified contracting was to attract commercial company participation, easing the burden on overhead staffs is probably a worthwhile adjustment to the government acquisition process.

Lastly, product specifications have been criticized as being too unique, too rigid, and as a result too costly to produce, when discussing government programs. We have seen that the commercial company's impetus is a product that will sell at a price acceptable to the customer. The product is exactly what the customer wants and the company's market analysis, research organization, product design and manufacturing unit have put it together for the consumer without a rigid set of unique specifications (other than those imposed on all producers in the marketplace). "Gold-plating" is frequently heard as the chief criticism of government requirements on products satisfying mission requirements should be the terms heard in articulating the needs of the government customer.

STRATEGY

The initial step in developing a workable approach to contracting for ATDs using IPPD with the government is to select a model of a program that demonstrates the fact that simplified contracting will work. After the selection, showing how and why it worked would be the next logical step, followed by an explanation of the payoffs that resulted, and any replicable "lessons learned" that were picked up along the way.

The model to be used would have to be derived from a successful, visible program, of significant size and scope. Whatever the program selected for the basis of the model, the nucleus of the resulting model would have to be able to be applied to a wide range of program types and the concept transitionable to future development/production programs. From there a "template" could be developed that would be used repeatedly once its utility were proven in test for contracting in a demonstration (ATD or ACDT).

After considering a number of candidate approaches, the X-31 activities provided the model/template program. The X-31 is a technology demonstration aircraft program. The model must be extended in concept to accommodate a low rate production program (since only two were built). While there was no production program planned for this demonstration, all the ingredients existed that would allow a reasonable assessment of how a simplified contracting process could be created. More importantly, the X-31 activity was conducted within the bounds of the existing DoD acquisition process for demonstrations, and used a simple but effective mechanism which is highly flexible and easy to replicate. It must be clearly understood that this mechanism is being considered as a template, not the X-31 program itself.

Figure 6. Minimum Plans on Contract for the X-31 Program

A set of contractor generated plans contained the aircraft performance requirements, which were incorporated into the contract as the top determining level in the order of precedence. These plans were binding on both the contractor and the government. The plans are then implemented on an Integrated Product/Process Development basis, by means of a set of program directives. A tailored contract was developed with customer support to specifically allow needed flexibility. For example, the contract stated that all performance, management, and technical specifications "shall be used as guides." The Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) was paired down to the minimum level necessary to report pertinent program data, and satisfy legal requirements. The normal cumbersome program review process was allowed to be streamlined to absolute minimums, then made a contractual requirement (more to reduce than to allow expansion of future reporting). Government inspection requirements were specifically ruled out, and clearly stated in the contract. Lastly, and very significantly, continuous process tailoring was contractually allowed. This gave the program "contractual flexibility." The program was conducted using informal data and less-than-formal meetings, but still emphasized and reached high quality, managed to a schedule and tracked costs. The use of simplified contracting procedures for program produced a 40% savings in cost, while quality and schedule parameters were met.

Figure 7. Data Reduction possible in Simplified Contracting

The X-31 program was conducted within the existing acquisition system. That is, there were no required waivers to the DoD Instruction 5000.1 or 5000.2. Although the program was conducted with the existing structure, there was a significant culture change as workers performed differently without the burdens of the old way of doing business. In addition, the real benefit of simplified contracting for demonstration projects using IPPD becomes evident when these programs are transitioned to production and beyond where the rigid acquisition systems barriers exist and cannot be overcome without formal changes or waivers to regulations. If the demonstration using IPPD is done correctly, it will provide a template for simplified contracting and will accelerate the transition to production.

From commercial practices, we know there is a sustained priority emphasis on cost from the very onset. Affordability (on the cost side of the equation) is the key to the commercial company's competitiveness. Consideration of increased costs up front for planning can be multiplied in savings downstream. This concept is also demonstrated in the section dealing with the up-front costs of Integrated Product/Process Development ( see page 22 Figure 4 ). A jointly developed (industry & government) standard contract which allows for the consideration of up-front cost planning, and the diminution of traditional requirements in the government contract, would be a worthy future effort.

The third section in this report, Multi-Use manufacturing presents a case study on the STU III Secure telephone program. This program can also be used as a case study for the simplification of contracting procedures. Keeping in mind that the goal of all of this activity is to achieve a process that closely resembles the commercial model, the elimination of the cost reporting requirements, coupled with the substantial reduction in the traditional government data rights normally found in government contracts, made the STU III program a good model for consideration when constructing the template for simplified contracting. Cost reports and data rights are certainly candidates to be considered for jointly developed standard contract clauses.

The Modular Avionics Radar (MODAR) program is another case presented in the Multi-Use manufacturing section of this report that has pertinence to simplified contracting. This program demonstrated that commercial electronic parts could successfully and safely be used in advanced "dual -use" applications. The product satisfies all of the intent and requirements of military specifications but was not built to military specifications. As further discussed in the "Multi-Use" section, the question of competition and sharing of information with companies other than the originator of the idea comes into play here as well as the situation where forward compatibility of commercial parts used in non-specification military systems needs to be addressed. Since these situations are likely to be typical if the direction defense acquisition is heading prevails, the criteria and assurances for accommodating these innovations must be well thought out and demonstrated. The recommendations for selected ATD's under Multi-use manufacturing addresses the determination of boundary conditions for selected key parameters, however it is well recognized that this area requires additional emphasis and effort.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A plan should be developed for implementation of a simplified contracting template for Advanced Technology Demonstrations that includes the concept of Integrated Product/Process Development, and Multi-use manufacturing. While only some of the potential simplifications were mentioned in this report, it is evident that there are many conditions that need to be addressed in dealing with changing the current contracting process to accommodate the new thinking of commercial processes and Affordability in development. Some of the specific items that should be included at the onset of this planning are:

  1. Preparation of a template for industry and government contracting officials to follow for Advanced Technology Demonstrations using IPPD.
  2. Selectively apply the baseline template to advanced Technology Demonstrations chosen for trial of other recommended Affordability innovations.
  3. Record the success or failure of the template, preserving the useful, discarding the unsuccessful but continually evolve the process to one that is workable, utilitarian, repeatable and has consensual agreement in industry and government.
  4. Solve and record in the template, such issues as:

MULTI-USE MANUFACTURING

Multi-use manufacturing was defined by the working group as "the ability to design and flexibly produce in a common 'factory', independent of lot size, a range of high quality products, thereby providing multiple, low volume, DoD products, access to advanced commercially viable processes and facilities with high volume economies."

In this definition, Manufacturing means the entire Manufacturing Enterprise, that is system concepts, design, development, production, materiel, fabrication processes, etc. Thus Multi-Use encompasses the entire "enterprise". Like Dual Use, which it includes, Multi-Use manufacturing envisions a single Industrial base built on a single technology base. It puts heavier emphasis on flexible manufacturing enterprise concepts. The implication of Flexible Manufacturing Enterprise can be seen in the vision statement of "low cost, high quality, short cycle time for a lot size of one across a wide range of products." Multi-Use Manufacturing envisions a single industrial base built on a single technological base. But, it puts a heavier emphasis on Flexible Manufacturing Enterprise concepts such as:

The Flexible Manufacturing Enterprise applies equally to commercial and military unique products. If the concept of broadly applied "dual use", including the application of appropriate commercial practices and processes to military unique products is added, you satisfy the definition of "Multi-Use Manufacturing." To expand on this idea, flexibility to product variation then includes: type/family, model, configuration/features, and size, whereas flexibility to process change would include cost improvement, model upgrades, new type or family of models, and regulatory compliance. Multi-use manufacturing also applies to families of unique military products and processes for which there may be no commercial equivalent, but for which flexible manufacturing economies of scale are essential. As the DoD markets shrink, multi-use Manufacturing becomes more essential to both the military and to the supporting industries.

In this environment multi-use manufacturing becomes the agent that allows:

These are the key ingredients to survival of the industry and to increases in competitiveness, see Figure 7.. As to the Affordability issue., multi-use allows a single set of resources for the use of both commercial and military enterprises. This lends to an integration of the commercial and defense bases into a national base. Standardization and modularity coupled with the flexibility to build a desired quantity of a given product at any time equals the "availability." The elimination of set-up times and potentially the waiting period for materiel shortens the cycle time, and gives facilities with only a small percentage of military product output the potential to greatly increase that percentage to satisfy a surge requirement in time of crisis. Multi-use Manufacturing would also allow for commercial companies to expand into military markets and defense contractors to expand into emerging markets. The sum of these parts equals an increase in survivability as well as increased competitiveness.

Fig 7. The Essentiallity of Multi Use Manufacturing

CASE STUDIES

There are success stories. Case studies were reviewed by the work group and demonstrated benefits were catalogued according to the above key ingredients. This cross reference in presented in tabular form in figure 8. MODAR

The Modular Avionics Radar program developed and fabricated a dual-use weather radar built with commercial parts. Design cycle time was considerably less than normally required time to develop a military radar system. Approximately 50% design cycle time reduction was experienced. Overall development cost was only 40% of costs to develop a similar military system.

This weather radar, with wind shear detection capability was developed based on a fire-control military system, but uses commercial parts throughout. It now serves commercial airlines and is also baseline equipment on US Air Force cargo aircraft. (C130H)

STU III

This secure telephone communications device and system, was available for less than a tenth of the cost of the equipment it replaced. A cooperative development between NSA, ATT, Motorola and RCA took three years instead of the traditional 7-11 normally encountered on telecommunications development. Designed and built to performance specifications rather than MIL-Specs, with no government cost reporting requirements and limited government data rights, this initiative has been highly beneficial to the customer (NSA) and the contractors that build it. Commercial expertise was put on the job; a new commercial market was identified and ATT & Motorola built new commercial business units based on this market. Over the years, the government customer has reaped additional benefits in terms of added features to the service because of the commercial base in place to support continual improvement. Price reduction has been continuous and is now approximately one third of the original unit price.

JET ENGINE CASING

Traditionally, jet engine casings are made using one process and facility. Casings for both military engines and commercial engines in this case study used virtually the same processes and facilities in spite of the fact that more stringent requirements were imposed on the military engine casings. GE built its military and commercial casings to the same more stringent requirements because they used the combined load to pay for better equipment and processes. GE was able to cost justify advanced manufacturing equipment which could not be justified by either load separately. In effect, this meant all parts and components were built to military specifications. The added process costs due to MILSPECS on commercial work however, was more than offset by the savings from the advanced equipment. In fact the cost reductions were significant. There were direct labor savings of 30%, a substantial reduction in overheads (49% reduction in indirect labor, 52% in other indirects). There was also a substantial cycle time improvement (75% reduction). This situation took place during the period of defense acquisition when orders for military engines was much larger. In today's downsizing of military requirements, the benefits gained by combining manufacturing needs of both customers by building to military requirements is no longer practical. However, the phenomenon still exists and if the process were reversed, so that everything was done to commercial requirements, significantly greater savings could be realized.

MIL-VAX

Under license to Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), Raytheon built a ruggedized military version of the commercial VAX mainframe computer. Standard DEC commercial VAX processors were militarized by Raytheon, taking advantage of the existing functional designs and software. There were no additional functional design or operating system costs incurred. Future operating system upgrades could be added to the military systems without incurring additional development costs or time necessary to conduct the development. Application development was treated as Commercial-of-the-shelf. An all around benefit resulted from this activity; one of the contractors added a market (the ruggedization of computer hardware by Raytheon), another contractor added revenues through additional sales and licensing fees. The defense customer also benefited through reduced costs due to reduced development requirements, and the ability to stay current on software updates by following in the commercial market.

COMMERCIAL PWA'S

The Air Force Electronic System Center (ESC) asked the Electronic Industries Association to assist in determining the kind of printed wiring assemblies that could be built to commercial practices. ESC wanted the industry association team to study and determine, in particular, the performance of the printed wiring assembly made to commercial specifications relative to the same printed wiring assemblies that were being built according to military specifications. In addition to the performance, a cost comparison was to be made to see if there would be any savings by not following military specifications and practices. The ensuing DEMO was developed jointly by industry and the USAF'ESC and performed at Rockwell International. The Rockwell results documented a thirty percent savings in both labor costs and reduced cycle time.

ACOUSTIC CHARGE TRANSPORT

The Acoustic Charge Transport was developed with ARPA funding. "Dual-Use" was the goal. The company that conceived the concept could not cost justify development on commercial grounds, and would have bypassed the opportunity had it not been for the government resources. The component is now used in the commercial market, and in military systems as well. A single manufacturing process produces the units for both military and commercial customers.

Figure 8. Highlights of Benefits Determined in the Case Studies

Success Discriminators

There have been many markets targeted for the infusion of Defense technology. However, just as in the commercial market place, there is no guarantee that the first technology to the marketplace will result in the successful product. Table 1 illustrates this point. The successful infusion of defense technology into the marketplace depends on a number of variables, and not the mere existence of the technology.

(Source: Roth Bill)
Table 1. Technology Alone Does Not Equal Market Success

Likewise, the notion of creating markets because of the technology advantage is one that has been proven to be erroneous in past attempts. There have been many attempts by aerospace firms to apply current or new technology to build houses and light rail train systems. Just about every aerospace firm has tried to integrate commercial information systems. Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC) produced a lot of good technology and capability, but it stayed in Defense. On the other hand, Microwave Monolithic Integrated Circuits (MIMIC) did get into the commercial base and did become a successful infusion of technology from defense. Two lessons can be gleaned from these occurrences then.

To be successful, Defense contractors doing business in the commercial market must have identified a real, new or expanding market, and have a credible approach to competitive production.

Technology lead doesn't insure commercial success.

The conclusions of a broadly based Electronics Industries Association (EIA) dual-use study points out that the commercial success discriminators. According to the EIA study, there doesn't appear to be a lot of understanding of commercial success discriminators.

In the 1960's, the Japanese started eating away the lower end of some U.S. markets, based on a cost advantage. At first we ceded them some on the low end, and then we tried lowering our own costs. About the same time, Japanese industry introduced a new level of Quality. Better Quality started initially on the factory floor. When the Japanese were well along in the control of processes through statistical process control (SPC), U.S. industry was focused on making the product cheaper. When U.S. industry became aware and started on the path to improved quality, the competition was moving quality forward into design for the next plateau, Variability Reduction. Although these process premises now have a strong foothold in U.S. Industry, the competition had progressed to reducing cycle times. This reduction was a direct result of the success gained in improving quality and reducing variances. It enabled the competition to make the "good product" on the first pass. That translates into more "good products" ready for the consumer in the marketplace in a lot less time. Most of U.S. industry is rapidly approaching that stage now. However, world class competitors are now moving on to the next phase, Product Variability. In this concept the manufacturing process is not impacted if the products in the production line are not the same. World class manufacturing lines do not care if everything coming down their line is the same. Their processes have flexibility. That is, they can manufacture different products not only within the same factory, but within same fabrication lines in a factory. Their processes can handle any lot size and, most importantly, cost and quality are independent of lot size. This is where competition is being determined today.

Figure 9. Where Competition Is Determined Today

Where is the next step in this evolution? Some seem to think that the next leaders of world class manufacturing participants will be the companies that are perceived to have "company goodness". This would assume that the product has reached near perfection, the customer is satisfied, the costs of producing high quality products are understood and controllable, and the quality of the product matches or beats the competition. Now the consumer perceives that the company has taken the extra steps, and made the extra effort to be environmentally friendly, producing products that are recyclable, using processes that have no impact on the workers, the residents in the vicinity of the plant, the atmosphere, the water table, and a host of other environmental issues.

The Manufacturing Enterprise Flexibility area shown in the above timeline representation of success discriminators, approximates where competition is being decided today, and for the near future. The vision of Manufacturing Enterprise Flexibility is "low cost/high quality/short cycle time for a lot size of one across a wide range of products." Flexibility includes both product variation and product/process change. The hallmarks of this approach are:

Table 2. Cases with Identifiable Success Factors

BARRIERS

The major barriers to achieving Multi-use manufacturing have been identified. They include attitudinal, technical and business process elements. While all of these barriers can be removed, some will be more difficult than others, most will have to be approached jointly by industry and government in order to be successful. The first, however, must be addressed by the Department of Defense.

There is the lack of an unmistakable signal from DoD to seriously start the transition process to multi-use manufacturing.

The department of Defense leadership must communicate the priority of "COST" starting at the very beginning and the essential role of dual-use commercial practices in meeting cost objectives. Until we really make cost (production & support) an equal and unequivocal requirement in the design process (along with performance) there will not be sufficient incentive on the part of industry to change as quickly as required to maintain clear and decisive technological combat superiority. Likewise, until the use of dual-use commercial processes becomes a routine necessary element of defense programs, there will be no rapid phase over.

Industry is reluctant to bear the transition costs without a clear payoff.

The concept of Manufacturing Enterprise Flexibility is not widely understood. It can involve a considerable amount of capital investment on the part of a company trying to enter into a world class competitive stance. Without some form of government participation or encouragement in terms of single direction, or common focus, at the very minimum, the defense manufacturing companies will continue the present high cost traditional practices.

There is widespread lack of confidence in the ability to meet DoD's requirements using commercial practices/processes/parts, due to the lack of objective knowledge of current limitations and capabilities when applied to various types of DoD products.

Successful use of manufacturing flexibility and commercial practices, processes and parts requires a shift from specification compliance management to cost/risk based management. This is difficult to do on a broad scale because of uncertainty and lack of guideposts. There is also a perception of high risk and skepticism.

As shown is Table 2, there have been some successes. It would be reasonable to assume that based on whatever small amount of success occured, there would be an expansion of the successful tactics employed that would result in even more demonstrable successes, as the industry gained confidence and as the new practices were initiated. However, this has not been the case. These successes have not been shared as "lessons learned". There has been very little "lessons learned" shared in the industry. Those companies who have succeeded consider detailed "lessons learned" to be a proprietary competitive advantage, and share only generalities. The industry cannot adequately capitalize on the commercial base if this "everyone for himself" approach is prevalent.

Unique DoD/Government acquisition rules are considered to be a major barrier.

Past practices of oversight used by the government to protect the taxpayer have indeed been a hindrance to many companies in the past. The requirements for cost reports and compliance to too rigid military specifications have been cited numerous times as being a major barrier to achieving multi-use manufacturing practices. Rights in data, which have been government contract requirements during the past, add to the list of unique government requirement complaints the industry considers to be barriers to change.

Resistance to change.

Resistance to change takes on many forms. The fear of change itself is a barrier to almost everything new. A slightly different phenomenon exists in this instance. Traditionally, the methods that were used in past defense programs reinforced job necessity. Some of these positions may now be deleted. Some of these "rice bowls" may have to be upset. "Pork" projects will have to be fought, and the public trust has yet to be regained at a level that will enable some of the innovative approaches to government acquisition, e.g. oversight.

STRATEGY

There are basically three strategic options:

Free Evolution will over time allow the use of commercial practices. In all probability the evolutionary process will be a series of jumps or spurts spurred on by crisis. In the meantime, occasional individual initiatives will occur. Some will succeed and some will fail because of situations like that of the dilemma of sharing "lessons learned" addressed earlier. This option is obviously too wasteful in time and resources, and is certainly not in step with the current administration's timeline for defense conversion.

Universal Enabling goes to the other extreme, and applies the available resources across-the-board resources to an industry and problem that is not yet well defined, given the period of downsizng of capabilities and requirements.

Selective Enabling uses a "Pareto-like' approach to focused Demos maximizing the return on investment and minimizing benefit realization time. The current unplanned evolutionary approach to Multi-Use Manufacturing isn't producing the required results. It is clear that broad front planning and enabling will dissipate already severely limited resources which are better used on lower risk choices. This middle road answer revolves around a strategy of Selective Enabling through product focused DEMOS, all concentrated on the high impact areas such as electronics, air-breathing engines, composites, and enterprise integration. Properly applied, this strategy provides the significantly improved information and understanding necessary for industry to objectively evaluate transition options in terms of both implementation approaches and realistic investment payback expectations. This strategy supplies objective data on the realizable benefits, which is essential to leveraging real change in the remaining barrier areas that are not within DOD's and industry's direct control.

Overall strategy should be planned and implemented on an integrated basis, and should be constantly and actively seeking to capitalize on the potential for synergism.

The Product Focused, and the Enabling Technologies DEMO programs offer many opportunities, both internally and between each other. For example, a good opportunity exists in the area of promulgation of results. Key to success is the ability to communicate lessons learned from all on-going and proposed activities. This requires the ability to capture and protect verifiable results, and make them readily and affordably available.

Figure 9. represents the schematic approach to "Selective Enabling". The product Focused demos addess the feasibility of commercial practices/processes/parts to meet DoD requirements. The Enabling Technology demos address design/manufacturing systems.

Figure 9. The Strategic Approach to "Selective Enabling."

COMMERCIAL APPROACH DEMO PROGRAM
Electronics Example

OBJECTIVE - Demonstrate the feasibility of designing and qualifying a wide variety of military electronics products using commercial practices, processes and parts to remove current technical uncertainties on the ability to meet a variety of military environments.

SCOPE - Avionics, Land vehicles , Naval Applications, Missile Systems, Troop Support, etc.

APPROACH - ARPA/MS&T/TRP

Initiate comprehensive program to determine environmental envelopes for key classes of components.

In parallel, initiate feasibility DEMOS on the order of 50 generic electronics subsystems, to bound the ability of commercial approaches to meet military performance and environmental requirements.

SCHEDULE - Complete characterization of component classes and subassembly demos within 30 months.

MANAGEMENT - TRI- Service teams to select demos, oversee implementation, verify and promulgate results.

INDUSTRY ROLE - Establish a support team to assist with planning and monitoring /promulgating results.

FUNDING - On the order of $50 million over the period.

ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES DEMO PROGRAM
OBJECTIVE - Accelerate implementation of multi-use manufacturing by demonstrating and promulgating capabilities of a flexible Manufacturing Enterprise.

SCOPE - IPPD, Simulation Expert Systems, Robust Design/Variability Management, Virtual Factories, Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Standardization, Modularity, Reuse, Virtual Reality Testing, etc.

APPROACH - Expand ARPA/MS&T program for Flexible Manufacturing

Enterprise Technologies.

SCHEDULE-

Demonstrate low volume access to high volume, low cost lines in several applications areas over 2 to 4 years.

Demonstrate and transition enabling technology building blocks throughout 1 to 4 year period.

MANAGEMENT - DoD Thrust 7 team.

INDUSTRY ROLE - Assist Thrust 7 team through NCAT Advisory Board.

FUNDING - ARPA ATD's , MS&T, MANTECH funding especially targeted on multi-use manufacturing.

RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. With industry input, clarify and publish specific Multi-use manufacturing Objectives, with particular emphasis on cost as an equal design criteria to performance. Focus on electronics and one or more high payoff areas, e.g air breathing propulsion.
  2. Substantially reduce technical uncertainty of commercial practice, processes and parts through a thirty month demonstration program that will determine and document boundary limitations.
  3. Substantially reduce technical uncertainties of enabling technologies through parallel two year DEMO program. Build on current ARPA/Services efforts in IPPD, Flexible Manufacturing, and Factory C3, such as IPPD for Modular Design, Flexible factory Processes and Controls, Robust Design Methodology for Commercial Components to meet Military Environments, Flexible Business Practices.
  4. Emphasize and increase Multi-use in "Lean" Manufacturing/AGILE, and plan additional enabling technology demonstrations within MS&T and TRP
  5. Provide ready low-cost access to latest verifiable Multi-Use enabling data, lessons learned, and benefits by establishing and maintaining easily accessed appropriate databases containing:
  6. Identify likely FY 95-99 Dual Multi-Use candidates and jointly with industry analyze requirements in light of above.
  7. Within three months, develop and initiate an Acquisition Approach for Feasibility Programs and DEMOs that would accommodate Cost accounting requirements & reporting, Data Rights, Military Specifications, Oversight, Social Programs. These approaches could take the form of specific or generic waivers, or forms of incentives to attract defense industry investment in commercial practices.
  8. Based on the experience from the selectively implemented Acquisition Track for Feasibility Programs and DEMOs, and on-going TRP/MS&T activities, within nine months develop and initiate broad implementation of a separate streamlined acquisition process for dual/Multi-Use technology/process based programs.
  9. Update Dual/Multi-use road maps and develop maintain, and communicate the associated strategic plan. Work jointly with government and industry through the Multi-Association Dual Use Focus Group.
  10. Develop and implement a plan to continually communicate substantial verifiable achievements and detailed Multi-Use enabler lessons learned to support the case for Acquisition Reform by demonstrating creditable results and significant benefits. These planning activities, the creation of the plans, roadmaps and education process can effectively be accomplished through the proven processes of the National Center for Advanced Technologies.

ENDNOTES

This concludes the report of the activities of the working groups for 1993. Significant findings and recommendations in the areas of Integrated Product/Process development by each of the teams indicates there is more work to be done in the implementation of IPPD. Each team operated independently, and while there was crosstalk at work shop conferences twice during the effort, the teams ideas and findings were generally not known to each other until the wrap up sessions. The significance of this lies in the almost unanimous finding and recommendations in areas of Multi-Use manufacturing and Integrated Product/Process Development.

Continuing in the work started by these three groups, an Industry Task Force has been formed, under the sponsorship of DDR&E, with the wholehearted support of the industry associations, and through the Secretariat of the National Center for Advanced Technologies to create the roadmaps and action plans for implementation of IPPD in Development Programs, the conduction of Multi-Use manufacturing in an Advanced Technology Demonstration and to further the industry 's direction on simplified contracting. This Task Force, which will kickoff 1994 activities on January 19th, 1994 will also address Integrated Product/Process Development in manufacturing for mechanical products, and Enterprise Integration, the use of information necessary to manage the organization and the industry in which it operates. The background papers, briefing materials and work papers of the 1993 working groups are available at the National Center for Advance Technologies, as is information pertaining to the 1994 Industry Task Force for Affordability.

Go to TOP of Page


Home - About NCAT - Affordability - IPPD - Contacts - Links - Archives
This site is under continuous change, last updated on March 21,1999
Please email all comments, errors, or additions to the webmaster.